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INTRODUCTION 
Implementing the rigorous governance and ownership standards 
established in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act1 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) for derivatives clearing 
organizations (“DCOs”) will promote free and open access to clearing, 
and reduce systemic risk within what is now the $700 trillion worldwide 
notional value derivatives market.2  These statutory standards are central 
to, and advance the key regulatory tenants of Dodd-Frank: i.e., to restore 
transparency, capital adequacy, and accountability to what was the 
previously unregulated over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market, by 
ensuring that swaps are cleared through financially sound DCOs.  Also, 
these rules will promote competition by curtailing the world’s large 
swap dealers’ (“SDs”) continued control over these markets to the 
disadvantage of swaps users and smaller dealers wishing to compete on 
a level playing field. 
This article focuses on the importance of swaps clearing to Dodd-
Frank-mandated market reforms and the need for fair and open access to 
that clearing.  Specifically, it shows that implementing objective 
governance standards for DCOs that include maximum capital 
requirements for DCO membership will enhance market stability, 
efficiency, and competitiveness.  To this end, the article focuses on 
clearing—as opposed to the related designated contract markets 
(“DCMs”) or swaps execution facilities (“SEFs”)—as clearing lies at the 
                                                                                                                                
 
 1. Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 2. Katy Burne, Complex Financial Bets Rise Ahead of Overhaul, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 16, 2011, at C4, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052970204190504577040372556074142.html. 
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heart of these Dodd-Frank market reforms.3  Also, although the article 
discusses the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) proposed 
rules on DCO governance and ownership in passing, it focuses on the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“CFTC”) rulemaking for 
DCOs since the CFTC has jurisdiction over 88% of the swaps market.4 
The article is divided into four parts.  First, it shows that Congress 
intended the CFTC to adopt rigorous rules regarding DCO governance 
and ownership that eliminate the conflicts of interest that has allowed 
SDs to stifle competition for clearing services and to charge 
unnecessarily high transaction fees to users of swaps.  Second, it 
explains how pre-Dodd-Frank market forces have limited access to 
clearing services.  Third, it demonstrates that the CFTC’s final rule on 
participant eligibility5—particularly the $50 million threshold for DCO 
membership—promises to both improve swap users’ access to clearing 
and ensure greater stability within the derivatives clearing market.  
Finally, the article suggests that the CFTC should strengthen its 
proposed governance standards for DCOs, in order to safeguard swap 
users’ access to clearing against the possibility that the CFTC’s 
participant eligibility requirements fail to increase DCO membership.6 
 
                                                                                                                                
 
 3. See Letter from Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Hous., and Urban Affairs, and Sen. Blanche Lincoln, Chairman, Senate Comm. on 
Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, to Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Comm., 
and Rep. Colin Peterson, Chairman, Comm. on Agric. (June 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/August/20110826/R-1415/R-1415_ 
082411_87659_389488835477_1.pdf (“Congress determined that clearing is at the 
heart of reform bringing transactions and counterparties into a robust, conservative and 
transparent risk management framework.”). 
 4. Correspondence by Chris Young, Dir. of U.S. Public Policy, Int’l Swaps and 
Derivatives Ass’n (noting that although the CFTC and SEC have yet to finalize the 
definition of “swap” and “security-based swap,” the CFTC will likely have jurisdiction 
over “[w]ell over 80%” of the derivatives market and probably close to 85% of the 
market) (on file with author). 
 5. See Derivatives Clearing Organization General Provisions and Core Principles, 
76 Fed. Reg. 69,334 (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Core Principles]. 
 6. See Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract 
Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of 
Interest, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) [hereinafter Proposed Rules]. 
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I. DODD-FRANK REQUIRES ALL SWAPS USERS TO HAVE FREE AND 
OPEN ACCESS TO CLEARING 
Dodd-Frank’s almost universal mandatory clearing requirement7 
for standardized swaps necessitates that swaps users have “fair and open 
access”8 to DCOs as well as to SEFs and DCMs.  SEFs and DCMs 
enable price discovery by posting the price and volume of exchange-
traded swap transactions.9  The public information generated by SEFs 
and DCMs ensures price transparency, which in turn promotes market 
liquidity by allowing swaps dealers to compete for business based on 
publicly available data.10  DCOs manage (and mitigate) systemic risk by 
guaranteeing the credit worthiness of swap counterparties, and requiring 
counterparties to set aside adequate collateral—i.e., margin—to prevent 
default.11  In this respect, DCOs eliminate the interconnectedness 
                                                                                                                                
 
 7. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376, 1675–76 
(2010) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in a swap unless that person 
submits such swap for clearing to a derivatives clearing organization . . . .”). See also 
id. § 763, 124 Stat. at 1762 (establishing parallel requirements for security-based 
swaps); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 32–35 (2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CRPT-111srpt176/pdf/CRPT-111srpt176.pdf (noting that draft provisions 
concerning OTC derivatives were designed to minimize non-cleared, off-exchange 
trades). 
 8. Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c), 124 Stat. at 1688. See id. § 723(a), 124 Stat. at 1676 
(“The rules of a derivatives clearing organization . . . shall . . . provide for non-
discriminatory clearing of a swap . . . .”); CFTC & SEC, PUBLIC ROUNDTABLE ON 
GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE CLEARING AND LISTING OF SWAPS 33 
(Aug. 20, 2010) [hereinafter ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT], available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/ 
dfsubmission9_082010.pdf (“[T]he law is clear: Open access is the fundamental 
principle.”) (statement of Randy Kroszner). 
 9. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,736. 
 10. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 29–35 (stating that the clearing of exchange-traded 
swaps will “provide . . . derivatives users with more price transparency and liquidity, 
and regulators with more information about the risks in the system”); see also BANK 
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, MARKET 
STRUCTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CLEARING INDUSTRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL 
STABILITY 57 (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss92.pdf. 
 11. See RENA S. MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41715, CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST IN DERIVATIVES CLEARING 1 (2011) (“Clearing is an institutional arrangement 
that helps protect against counterparty default.  A DCO, or clearinghouse, clears and 
settles derivatives contracts between counterparties.”); BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
supra note 10, at 57 (“Central clearing generally reduces systemic risk and therefore 
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between financial institutions that contributed to the 2008 financial 
crisis that was precipitated by cascading counterparty risk emanating 
from the bankruptcy or need to rescue the likes of Bear Stearns, Lehman 
Brothers, and AIG.12 
Given the importance of clearing to Dodd-Frank-mandated market 
reforms,13 Congress directed financial regulators to establish rigorous 
regulations that would ensure well-capitalized market participants’ 
eligibility for clearing membership,14 thereby reducing market 
concentration, and “mitigat[ing] conflicts of interest” in the operation of 
DCOs.15  Congress was acutely aware of the over-concentration and 
conflicts of interest—the “problem[s]”—that arise when “95 percent of 
all of the clearinghouses in this country are owned by just five banks” 
who, in turn limit competition for clearing services in order to boost 
their profits.16  To eliminate this problem, Congress provided regulators 
with broad authority to adopt less restrictive participant membership 
criteria for DCOs17 and “strong conflict of interest rules on control . . . 
of clearing and trading facilities.”18 
Dodd-Frank includes specific provisions that prohibit DCOs from 
imposing arbitrary and excessive capital requirements on clearing 
members and that help ensure that DCO policies and procedures are not 
                                                                                                                                
 
carries social benefits.  Principally, it reallocates credit risks to an entity . . . whose 
dedicated role it is to manage those risks in a robust and transparent manner.”). 
 12. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,736. 
 13. See Letter from Senators Christopher Dodd and Blanche Lincoln, supra note 3. 
 14. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 725(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1687 (2010). 
 15. Id. § 726(b), 124 Stat. at 1695. See id. § 726(c) ( “[T]he Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission shall “consider any conflicts of interest arising from the amount 
of equity owned by a single investor . . . and the governance arrangements of any 
derivatives clearing organization that clears swaps . . . .”); 156 CONG. REC. H5217 
(daily ed. June 30, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-06-
30/pdf/CREC-2010-06-30.pdf (recording a colloquy between Representative Stephen 
Lynch and Representative Barney Frank in which both Congressmen agreed that 
sections 726 and 765 require the CFTC and the SEC “to conduct rulemakings to 
eliminate the conflicts of interest arising from the control of clearing and trading 
facilities by entities such as swap dealers and major swap participants”). 
 16. 156 CONG. REC. H5217 (daily ed. June 30, 2010). 
 17. See Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c), 124 Stat. at 1687. 
 18. 156 CONG REC. H5217 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Lynch) 
(emphasis added). 
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unduly influenced by the interests of large SDs.  Section 725 of Dodd-
Frank directs the CFTC to promulgate rules that require DCOs to 
establish “appropriate admission and continuing eligibility standards . . . 
for members of, and participants in . . . derivatives clearing 
organization[s]” so as to ensure “fair and open access” to clearing 
services.19  Additionally, section 726 of the statute directs the CFTC to 
establish governance standards and limits on the ownership of voting 
equity that would mitigate the “conflicts of interest” that encourage 
large SDs/banks to clear trades bilaterally rather than—as Dodd-Frank 
mandates—through clearinghouses.20  Section 726 directs the CFTC to 
limit the amount of equity a single investor may own in a DCO so that 
large SDs cannot use their influence as DCO stakeholders to hamper 
access to clearing membership.21 
II. SD-DOMINATED CLEARINGHOUSES HAVE PLACED PROFITS OVER 
PRUDENT RISK-MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES  
Large SDs have to date dominated the clearing industry and, as a 
consequence, have tended to oppose rules that establish reasonable 
ownership limitations and governance standards for DCOs.22  As 
Senator Sherrod Brown observed in his comments on the CFTC’s 
proposed conflicts of interest rules, “[t]he financial services industry is 
arguing for a DCO membership regime that would favor the large dealer 
                                                                                                                                
 
 19. Dodd-Frank Act § 725(c), 124 Stat. at 1688. 
 20. Id. § 726(c), 124 Stat. at 1695; see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra 
note 10, at 67 (“[T]he incentives of users to resist the expansion of central clearing . . . 
might lead to migration towards the CCP of products previously cleared bilaterally and 
profitably for the CCP members themselves.”); DerivAlert, Q&A With Hal Scott of 
Harvard Law: Clearinghouse Ownership and Risk, TRADEWEB (Oct. 20, 2010),  
http://www.tradeweb.com/Blog/Q-A-With-Hal-Scott-of-Harvard-Law--Clearinghouse-
Ownership-and-Risk/. 
 21. See Dodd-Frank Act § 726, 124 Stat. at 1695. 
 22. See Satyajit Das, Central Counter Party Tranquilliser Solutions, NAKED 
CAPITALISM (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11/satyajit-das- 
central-counter-party-tranquilliser-solutions.html (“Predictably, large highly capitalised 
banks favour higher capital requirements, ensuring their dominant position.”); Dawn 
Kopecki, U.S. Derivatives Bill Bars Dealers From Owning Clearinghouses, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/ 
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agLyUl0aqYuk (discussing the financial industry’s 
opposition to limits on the ownership of clearing facilities). 
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banks who currently dominate the OTC derivatives market.”23  When 
Dodd-Frank passed, 90% of swaps were traded through the world’s ten 
largest banks; swaps trading generated approximately $60 billion in 
revenue a year for these banks.24  As mentioned above, the five largest 
commercial banks—JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs, and HSBC—accounted for approximately 96% of the 
total banking industry’s notional amounts and 85% of the industry’s net 
credit exposure in the derivatives market.25  These large banks—banks 
that “control the trading of derivatives and all key elements of the 
infrastructure of derivatives trading”26—have resisted reforms that aim 
to increase access to clearing and, subsequently, reduce the significant 
profits that large banks generate from bilateral trading.27 
Because Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandates will not apply to any 
swap executed before the statute’s regulations are implemented well into 
2013, the big SDs continue to dominate swaps clearing and to limit 
access to clearing in order to ensure that banks can still extract 
extraordinary profits from OTC trading.  For example, an overwhelming 
number of clearing members of ICE Clear Europe are large banks, large 
bank holding companies, or affiliates thereof.28  Such members include, 
                                                                                                                                
 
 23. Comment Letter from Sen. Sherrod Brown to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, and Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n (Nov. 17, 2010), available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ 
ViewComment.aspx?id=26486&SearchText=. 
 24. See Gretchen Morgenson, It’s Not Over Until It’s in the Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 29, 2010, at BU1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/29/business/ 
29gret.html?pagewanted=1&ref=derivatives. 
 25. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY 
REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES: SECOND QUARTER 2010 
(2010). 
 26. ROBERT E. LITAN, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE DERIVATIVES DEALERS’ CLUB 
AND DERIVATIVES MARKETS REFORM: A GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS, CITIZENS AND 
OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES 3 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0407_derivatives_litan/0407_derivatives_litan.pdf. 
 27. See id.; see also ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 111 (“The 
transaction fees and the spreads still make an unregulated market very, very profitable, 
probably more profitable than the profits that would derive from clearing. So, if you 
have the swaps dealers in control of a clearing facility, they have that incentive.”). 
 28. See ICE Clear Europe Clearing Members, ICE (Dec. 13, 2012), available at 
https://www.theice.com/publicdocs/clear_europe/ICE_Clear_Europe_Clearing_Membe
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but are not limited to, the five large U.S. commercial banks mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, Barclays Bank, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse 
International, and Deutsche Bank.29  These same large financial entities 
constitute the vast majority of the clearing members of ICE Trust, which 
is a U.S. affiliate of ICE Clear Europe.30  Also, NYSE Euronext, which 
runs the New York Stock Exchange and New York Portfolio Clearing, is 
partnered with several large banks including Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley.31  Thus, the concentration within the derivatives 
clearing market remains high, and continues to raise “concerns about 
anti-competitive pricing and conduct.”32 
Large banks have used their considerable influence as major 
stakeholders in DCOs33 to keep smaller but highly credit-worthy 
institutions out of the clearing market.34  As the CFTC has observed, 
“enumerated entities have economic incentives to minimize the number 
of swap contracts subject to mandatory clearing,” and have used their 
influence as DCO members to keep “swap contracts out of the 
mandatory clearing requirement.”35  Also, Gary deWaal, general counsel 
at Newedge in New York, has argued that “[s]ome current capital 
                                                                                                                                
 
r_List.pdf (listing the banks and bank holding companies (and their affiliates) as well as 
other major financial entities that constitute ICE Clear Europe’s members). 
 29. See id. 
 30. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,735 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010). 
 31. See Jonathan Spicer, US Lawmakers Urged to Drop Clearinghouse Ownership 
Cap, REUTERS (Nov. 20, 2009, 2:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/20/ 
us-financial-clearing-limit-idUSTRE5AJ3ZM20091120. 
 32. Letter from Sen. Sherrod Brown, supra note 23; see Suzanne Miller, 
Derivatives Risks Still Loom Large, THE DEAL MAGAZINE (Dec. 9, 2011, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.thedeal.com/magazine/ID/043305/features/derivatives-risks-still-loom-
large.php (reporting that “large clearing groups pose significant concentration risks in 
the leading Western markets” and that “[c]oncentration risks loom as exchanges and 
clearinghouses continue to consolidate”). 
 33. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,734 (noting that because DCOs spread 
their losses across their members—members contribute substantial resources to a DCO 
default or guarantee fund that is used to cover outstanding losses that result from a 
member’s default—members exercise significant influence over how a DCO manages 
risk). 
 34. See ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 26 (stating that banks have 
been “really clever about keeping people out of the system”). 
 35. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,734. 
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requirements [for DCO membership] are exclusionary.”36  Specifically, 
DCOs have imposed capital requirements for clearinghouse membership 
eligibility that far exceed the requirements needed for conservative risk 
management.  For example, in 2010, the same year that Congress passed 
Dodd-Frank, ICE Trust required new members to contribute a minimum 
of $1 billion of adjusted net capital to the general guaranty fund, and 
required non-futures commercial merchants to have $5 billion of 
tangible net worth in order to qualify for DCO membership.37  Thus, 
SDs appear to have employed clearinghouse ownership as a tool to stifle 
competition within the derivatives clearing market and, subsequently, to 
force swaps users to pay the substantial fees banks charge for bilateral 
clearing, and to use execution facilities controlled by these same SDs.38 
III. RESTRICTING THE CAPITAL REQUIREMENT FOR DCO MEMBERS 
WILL FACILITATE GREATER ACCESS TO CLEARING AND MORE 
DIVERSE OWNERSHIP OF DCOS 
The CFTC’s final participant eligibility rule establishes 
requirements for DCO membership that promote swap traders and 
investors’ access to clearing.39  The final rule requires DCOs to adopt 
objective, publicly disclosed, and risk-based admission and continuing 
eligibility standards for DCO membership.40  These standards must also 
                                                                                                                                
 
 36. Matt Cameron, A Clash Over CCP Membership, RISK MAGAZINE (Feb. 3, 
2011), http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2015731/clash-ccp-membership. 
 37. Comment Letter from Michael Greenberger, Professor, Univ. of Md. Sch. of 
Law, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Re: ICE Trust 
U.S. LLC – Application for Registration as a Derivatives Clearing Organization 
Pursuant to Section 5b of the Commodity Exchange Act and Part 39 of the Regulations 
of the Commission 5 (Dec. 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger_CFTC_ICE_Trust_Application
_for_DCO.pdf. 
 38. Thomas Peterffy, Chairman and CEO, Interactive Brokers Grp., Comments 
Before the 2010 General Assembly of the World Federation of Exchanges, at 2 (Oct. 
11, 2010), available at http://www.interactivebrokers.com/download/ 
worldFederationOfExchanges.pdf (blaming “short-sighted greed on the part of the 
brokers” for restricting access to clearing markets). 
 39. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,436 (Nov. 8, 2011). 
 40. Id. 
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represent the least restrictive means to achieve the DCO’s objectives.41  
Significantly, the final rule prevents DCOs from setting a minimum 
capital requirement of more than $50 million (i.e., a $50 million 
threshold) for any institution seeking clearing membership.42  Also, the 
final rule requires DCOs to establish “capital requirements that are 
based on objective, transparent, and commonly accepted standards that 
appropriately match capital to risk.”43 
The SEC has proposed similar participant eligibility and risk-
management requirements to those found in the CFTC’s final rule.44  
The SEC’s proposed rule would require DCOs to “provide a person that 
maintains net capital equal to or greater than $50 million with the ability 
to obtain membership at the clearing agency.”45  It would also require 
DCOs to “establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies 
and procedures” for risk management purposes.46 
A. ESTABLISHING A $50 MILLION THRESHOLD FOR DCO MEMBERSHIP 
PROMISES TO ENSURE GREATER STABILITY AND COMPETITION WITHIN 
THE DERIVATIVES CLEARING MARKET 
The $50 million threshold will allow smaller but strong, financial 
entities that could not satisfy the excessive membership requirements 
imposed by large SDs to become DCO members and compete to provide 
clearing services to individual traders and investors.47  As CFTC 
                                                                                                                                
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 69,437. See Comment Letter from Professor, Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, 
to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Re: Financial 
Resources Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations (Dec. 13, 2010), 
available at http://michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger_DCO_Financial_ 
Resources.pdf. 
 43. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,437. 
 44. Clearing Agency Standards for Operation and Governance, Exchange Act 
Release No. 64,017, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,472 (proposed Mar. 16, 2011). 
 45. Id. at 14,538. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,355–56 (observing that lowered capital 
requirements will increase the number of firms clearing swaps).  See Letter from CME 
Grp. to the Secretariat of the Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Re: Consultative 
Document: Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector, at 11 (Apr. 16, 2010) 
[hereinafter Letter from CME Group], available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165/ 
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Chairman Gary Gensler observed, the CFTC’s final capital requirement 
for DCO membership “promotes more inclusiveness . . . [and] improves 
competition that will benefit end-users of swaps, while protecting 
DCOs’ ability to manage risk.”48  Similarly, the Department of Justice 
has long maintained that “strict” minimum requirements for DCO 
membership would “limit the possibility of anticompetitive conduct” by 
SDs in the derivatives clearing market.49  The Department of Justice has 
also claimed that such strict requirements would create “competitive 
benefits” for market participants, such as lower costs of clearing 
transactions for swaps traders and improved market liquidity by helping 
to ensure that DCOs cooperate with SEFs and DCMs to facilitate 
exchange trading.50 
The financial industry has argued that the increase in DCO 
membership, facilitated by lowered capital requirements, will increase 
risk in derivatives clearing.  Large SDs insist that current capital 
“requirements are [now] set at prudent levels to ensure the safety of the 
clearing house[s]” and dismiss claims that such requirements are 
“exclusionary” or based on unsound risk management principles.51  For 
example, Christopher Edmonds, president of ICE Trust in New York, 
asserted that “[c]apital requirements are part of the safety net in a default 
scenario, together with other factors such as margin and the default 
fund.”52  Similarly, Bill Hill, of Morgan Stanley, insisted that unless 
DCOs “have clearing members who have enough capital . . . to 
recapitalize the clearinghouse if a member defaults . . . [and] to keep the 
                                                                                                                                
 
cmegroup.pdf (reporting that in 2009 CME processed and cleared approximately 2.6 
billion contracts with an estimated notional value of $813 trillion). 
 48. Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Statements of 
Support by Chairman Gary Gensler: Position Limits (Oct. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/genslerstatement101811b. 
 49. Comment Letter from the Dep’t of Justice to the Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, at 2 (Dec. 28, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
comments/265618.htm. 
 50. Id. at 3 (“Dealers might use their control over a DCO to resist the move to 
exchange trading by declining to clear contracts that are well-suited to central clearing 
but that the CFTC has not yet required to be centrally cleared.”). 
 51. Cameron, supra note 36 (quoting an anonymous US dealer who asserted that 
“[t]he chatter about requirements being exclusionary and labelling current members a 
cabal is just rubbish”). 
 52. Id. 
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clearinghouse flat from an economic risk perspective . . . you actually 
increase risk in the clearinghouse because at a time when a member is 
defaulting, the clearinghouse won’t be able to absorb the losses.”53  
Thus, large SDs have consistently argued that they are uniquely 
qualified, by virtue of their vast financial resources, to insure against 
risk in the derivatives clearing market. 
The systemic failure of the banking industry during the 2008 
financial crisis undermines by inference the argument that large SDs are 
best situated to guarantee stability within the derivatives clearing 
market.  Large SDs proved incapable of stemming the financial crisis, 
and relied on almost $13 trillion of taxpayer bailouts and guarantees to 
remain in business.54  Further, the five major commercial U.S. banks 
that dominate the derivatives market were some of the first financial 
institutions to receive funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP).55  The crisis exposed the vulnerabilities of individual SDs—
namely their collective inability to diversify risk by means other than 
relying on taxpayer subsidies56—and suggests that restricting DCO 
membership to large SDs jeopardizes, rather than improves market 
stability. 
In contrast to current swaps clearing membership practices, the 
CFTC’s $50 million cap for market participants satisfies Congress’s 
directive that DCOs have “sufficient financial resources . . . to meet 
their obligations.”57  Expanding DCO ownership will decrease the 
magnitude of any membership default by distributing the costs of default 
across a greater number of members.  It will also decrease “the high 
degree of market concentration” within the derivatives market, as this 
concentration “still has the potential to result in the nullification of tens 
                                                                                                                                
 
 53. ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 18–19. 
 54. The True Cost of the Bank Bailout, PBS (Sept. 3, 2010, 8:25 AM), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/economy/the-true-cost-of-the-bank-bailout/ 
3309/. 
 55. MILLER, supra note 11, at Summary. 
 56. Id. at 2 (“Before 2007, such firms were generally viewed as too well diversified 
or too well managed to fail.  In 2008, their vulnerability was shown to be greater than 
previously assumed, and the question of their long-term creditworthiness now depends 
in part on whether the government would again intervene to ensure that their contracts 
are honored during a future crisis.”). 
 57. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 725(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 1688 (2010). 
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of billions of dollars worth of contracts.”58  As Newedge’s Gary deWaal 
observed: “[m]embership needs to be opened up—clearing works when 
there is a large buffer of intermediaries dispersing the risk.  If the risk is 
spread between too few entities, it is too close to bilateralism. You need 
to have different groups of clearing members, which lessens the 
correlation in the clearinghouse.”59  In this respect, prudent risk 
management strategies require that DCO members have adequate capital 
resources, and that members are sufficiently numerous so that risk is 
spread across a diverse array of financial organizations. 
Further, history demonstrates that broad-based risk management 
strategies that offer membership to a large number of financially stable 
institutions foster long-term stability for markets and market 
participants.  For example, the CME Group, which operates one of the 
largest clearinghouses in the world and has over sixty members,60 has 
not defaulted on an obligation to a clearing member (or had a clearing 
member default on an obligation to CME) during its 110-plus year 
history.61  The historical stability of diverse clearinghouses supports the 
CFTC’s conclusion that the $50 million threshold “will not significantly 
increase risk or lead to admission of clearing members who are unable 
to meaningfully and responsibly participate in the clearing process.”62  
In fact, the final threshold for DCO membership will likely reduce risk 
for clearing members by including a diverse number of institutions that 
go beyond the “Too Big to Fail” banks that caused the 2008 financial 
crisis. 
Moreover, the CFTC’s final rule on clearinghouse core principles, 
which includes the CFTC’s final participant eligibility rule, requires 
DCOs to establish minimum risk management standards to mitigate the 
risk posed by member default.63  The CFTC requires DCOs to direct 
                                                                                                                                
 
 58. MILLER, supra note 11, at Summary. 
 59. Cameron, supra note 36. 
 60. See Clearing Firms, CME GROUP, http://www.cmegroup.com/tools-
information/clearing-firms.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2012). 
 61. Letter from CME Group, supra note 47, at 11. 
 62. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,334, 69,355 (Nov. 8, 2011). 
 63. Id. (noting that some commentators argued that the proposed capital 
requirements “should not increase risk to a DCO because a DCO can mitigate risk by, 
among other things, imposing position limits, stricter margin requirements, or stricter 
default deposit requirements on lesser capitalized clearing members”). 
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their members to post margin and authorizes DCOs to implement “other 
risk control mechanisms” that “limit . . . exposure to potential losses 
from defaults by clearing members.”64  DCOs must collect margin that is 
commensurate with the particular risks associated with an individual 
clearing member’s portfolio or product and reassess a member’s level of 
risk on a regular basis.65  Additionally, a DCO must ensure that clearing 
members “have access to sufficient financial resources to meet 
obligations” to the DCO under “extreme but plausible market 
conditions.”66  The regular and detailed review of DCO members’ risk 
exposure required by the CFTC’s final risk management rule further 
safeguards DCOs from the possibility of customer default, even as 
DCOs experience a significant increase in membership. 
Finally, lowering the capital threshold for DCO ownership best 
ensures that the profits that will result from Dodd-Frank’s mandatory 
clearing requirement will be distributed across a wide-spectrum of 
participants within the derivatives clearing market.  Dodd-Frank’s 
clearing requirement will radically increase the volume of clearing swap 
trades and “result in trillions of dollars in derivatives transactions 
moving from the OTC dealer market into a clearing environment.”67  
The CFTC’s $50 million threshold will prevent SDs from having 
exclusive access to substantial profits generated by mandatory clearing 
that will increase the capital reserves of market participants as a whole. 
 
B. INCREASING/CIRCUMVENTING MINIMUM CAPITAL  
REQUIREMENTS FOR DCO MEMBERSHIP 
 
The CFTC clearly intends DCOs to honor the $50 million threshold 
for DCO membership.  However, the limited exceptions to the $50 
million threshold, as well as the operational requirements included in the 
final participant eligibility rule, may be viewed as a loophole that will 
                                                                                                                                
 
 64. Id. at 69,418.  See also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 10, at 66 
(“[M]argins often constitute an important part of the CCP’s protection against default . . 
. .”). 
 65. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,417–18. 
 66. Id. at 69,437. 
 67. MILLER, supra note 11, at 4; see also Kopecki, supra note 22 (quoting 
Congressman Barney Frank as saying that Dodd-Frank will “driv[e] a lot of business to 
the exchanges”). 
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allow DCOs to impose higher capital requirements for clearing 
members. 
As previously mentioned, the final rule authorizes DCOs to exceed 
the $50 million threshold in order to “set forth capital requirements . . . 
that appropriately match capital to risk.”68  It also authorizes DCOs to 
use participant capital to ensure that clearing members meet their 
obligations to the DCO.69  Additionally, the final rule directs DCOs to 
“require clearing members to have adequate operational capacity” to 
meet their obligations to the DCO.70  Such requirements include, but are 
not limited to the member’s ability to: process expected volumes and 
values of cleared transactions within a specified time frame; fulfill 
collateral, payment, and delivery obligations to the DCO; and participate 
in default management activities.71 
The CFTC clearly does not intend for DCOs to establish member 
capital requirements that exceed the $50 million threshold.  The final 
rule requires that a DCO not “enact[] some additional financial 
requirement that effectively renders the $50 million threshold 
meaningless for some potential clearing members.”72  The CFTC 
maintains that any such additional financial requirement would violate 
the final rule’s prerequisite that a DCO “not adopt restrictive clearing 
member standards if less restrictive requirements that achieve the same 
objective and that would not materially increase risk to the derivatives 
clearing organization or clearing members could be adopted.”73  The 
final rule’s ban on needlessly restrictive requirements applies to a 
DCO’s operational capacity and member eligibility requirements.74  
Additionally, as previously noted, the final rule requires DCOs to base 
member capital requirements “on objective, transparent, and commonly 
accepted” risk management standards, so that DCOs cannot impose 
arbitrary restrictions on their members.75 
                                                                                                                                
 
 68. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,437. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 69,356. 
 73. Id. at 69,436. 
 74. Id. at 69,355–56. 
 75. Id. at 69,437. 
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Despite the fact that the CFTC prohibits DCOs from imposing 
financial requirements that render the $50 million threshold 
meaningless, the limited discretion that the final rule allows in relation 
to capital and operational requirements have been mistakenly and 
worrisomely read to allow DCOs to circumvent requirements that are 
designed to increase DCO membership.  For example, CFTC 
Commissioner O’Malia observed in his dissent to the final rule: “[t]he 
final rulemaking recognizes that DCOs may increase capital 
requirements for legitimate, risk-reducing reasons,” but “provides little 
insight on how the Commission intends to differentiate between (i) a 
required risk-based increase in capital requirements and (ii) an 
illegitimate attempt to circumvent the $50 million threshold to squash 
competition.”76  Further, he dismissed the CFTC’s requirement that 
DCOs adopt less restrictive alternatives as too “vague” to provide “legal 
certainty or bright lines for DCOs and potential clearing members to 
follow.”77  Again, these remarks are part of a dissent to passage of the 
final rule and should not be viewed as conclusively interpretive by the 
CFTC. 
Unfortunately, however, the industry may try to exploit any 
ambiguity in the rule.  As a senior industry representative recently 
observed, “the debate is going to centre” on the exceptions to the $50 
million threshold since the “rule essentially gives DCOs . . . the ability 
to impose extra capital requirements, if they can prove it contributes to 
prudent risk management.”78  In this respect, the final rule may provide a 
loophole for DCOs by allowing them to “appropriately match capital to 
risk.”79 
                                                                                                                                
 
 76. Scott D. O’Malia, Comm’r, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Statement 
of Dissent, Final Rulemaking On Derivatives Clearing Organizations (Oct. 18, 2011), 
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/ 
SpeechesTestimony/omaliastatement101811b. 
 77. Id. In 2011, ICE Clear Credit reduced its minimum capital requirement for 
clearing members to $100 million, but introduced a requirement that its members hold 
excess net capital equal to 5% of their segregated customer funds. Id.  The change 
prompted two FCMs to complain that ICE’s net capital requirements violated fair and 
open access requirements, and led O’Malia to conclude that the CFTC’s “final 
rulemaking gives very little guidance on the criteria that the Commission will apply in 
adjudicating a dispute . . . .” Id. 
 78. Cameron, supra note 36. 
 79. Core Principles, 76 Fed. Reg. at 69,437. 
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The minimal operational capacity requirements established by the 
final rule may provide DCOs with an additional opportunity to restrict 
clearing membership.80  For example, CME has identified operational 
capacity as an “important hurdle” to DCO membership and insists that 
“[p]rospective clearing members must be able to provide evidence they 
have the requisite expertise to perform the duties required of a clearing 
member,”81 including the capability to price and manage large 
derivatives portfolios.  To this end, DCOs like CME have suggested that 
members should operate an internal trading desk to ensure that they 
provide DCOs with accurate pricing information,82 a requirement that 
FCMs like Jefferies and Newedge have argued is totally unnecessary 
and constitutes “just another artificial barrier to keep the largest 
independent firms out.”83 
The kinds of further protections proposed by the CFTC are 
critically important because of these contrivances. 
 
IV. RIGOROUS GOVERNANCE STANDARDS AND LIMITATIONS ON 
OWNERSHIP INTERESTS FOR DCOS WILL HELP TO ENSURE  
FREE AND OPEN ACCESS TO CLEARING 
 
The CFTC and the SEC have proposed rules to mitigate the 
conflicts of interest that Congress determined threaten to exclude 
financial institutions from various swaps clearing memberships.84  Like 
the CFTC’s final rule on participant eligibility, the CFTC’s proposed 
conflicts of interest standards for DCOs, SEFs, and DCMs (“designated 
entities”) promote access to clearing and exchange trading by curbing 
SDs’ ability to restrict the membership in a designated entity.85  The 
shared aims of the CFTC’s final rule on participant eligibility and the 
                                                                                                                                
 
 80. Cameron, supra note 36. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,733 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010).  
See also Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based 
Swap Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National 
Securities Exchanges with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 
Exchange Act Release No. 63,107, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882 (proposed Oct. 26, 2010). 
 85. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,733. 
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CFTC’s proposed conflicts-of-interest rule risk creating overlapping and 
perhaps even redundant regulation.  Despite this fact, the CFTC should 
finalize rigorous governance standards for DCOs that eliminate conflicts 
of interest in derivatives clearing86 in order to safeguard the protections 
promised by the CFTC’s final $50 million cap on capital requirements 
for DCO membership. 
Although this section focuses on the CFTC’s proposed governance 
rules for DCOs, the issues discussed below also pertain to the CFTC’s 
proposed rules regarding the governance of SEFs and DCMs, and to the 
SEC’s proposed governance rules for designated entities.  Many of the 
elements that comprise the CFTC’s proposed governance standards for 
DCOs also comprise the CFTC’s proposed governance rules for 
designated entities generally.  For example, the CFTC’s proposed rules 
require DCOs, SEFs, and DCMs to establish nominating committees 
and disciplinary panels87 and have the same percentage of public 
directors (35%)—directors who have no material relationship with a 
clearinghouse or its members88—on their Boards of Directors.89  
                                                                                                                                
 
 86. See Huw Jones, Clearing House Ownership Not a Risk Issue – Report, 
INVESTING.COM (Nov. 10, 2010, 12:13 PM), http://www.forexpros.com/news/central-
banks/clearing-house-ownership-not-a-risk-issue—-report-173337 (“Clearing houses 
will play a key role in determining which derivatives and other products can be cleared 
and regulators say stakeholders like banks may be tempted to pursue their own financial 
interests to the detriment of risk management.”); BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra 
note 10, at 57 (“[I]n determining whether or not to have trades cleared . . . market 
participants may consider only the private benefits they obtain from doing so.  They 
may not consider the positive effects central clearing may have for third parties or the 
economy at large.”); Matthew Leising, Derivatives Clearinghouse-Ownership Limits 
Are Dropped from U.S. Bank Bill, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2010, 1:44 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-25/derivatives-clearinghouse-ownership-
limits-are-dropped-from-u-s-bank-bill.html (“The limit was meant to reduce bank 
conflicts of interest over their control of clearinghouses and how they could block over-
the-counter derivatives from being processed because they benefit from keeping the 
trades private.”). 
 87. See Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,733. 
 88. Id. at 63,747 (proposing a bright-line definition of “public director”).  The 
proposed definition expressly excludes the following persons: a DCO officer or 
employee; a director, officer, or employee of a DCO member; an officer of an entity 
that has a compensation committee (or equivalent body) upon which an officer from the 
DCO serves; a partner, officer, or employee of an entity that receives over $100,000 in 
combined annual payments for legal, accounting, or consulting services from the DCO; 
or a committee director who accepts a contingent, conditioned, or revocable consulting, 
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Similarly, many of the same elements appear in the CFTC and the 
SEC’s proposed conflicts rules (e.g., proposing the same individual and 
aggregate limits on ownership of voting equity).90  Consequently, 
despite its narrow focus, the following analysis raises many issues that 
are relevant to the conflicts of interest that threaten the clearing of both 
exchange-traded swaps and exchange-traded security-based swaps. 
A. THE CFTC’S PROPOSED GOVERNANCE STANDARDS AIM TO ENSURE 
FAIR AND OPEN ACCESS TO CLEARING 
The CFTC’s proposed conflicts of interest rule aims to “improve 
the governance of certain DCOs”91 by increasing the number of public 
directors who comprise a DCO’s Board, as well as its governing 
committees.92  Accordingly, the proposed rule requires that a DCO’s 
Board of Directors be comprised of at least 35% public directors, 93 no 
fewer than two public directors, and at least 10% DCO customers or 
customer representatives.94  The proposed rule also requires DCOs to 
establish nominating committees that must be comprised of at least 51% 
public directors95 and at least one disciplinary panel that comprises at 
least one public director, who also must chair the committee.96  
Additionally, the CFTC’s proposed governance standards require a 
DCO to create a risk management committee that is comprised of at 
                                                                                                                                
 
advisory, or other compensatory fee (other than deferred compensation) from the DCO, 
its affiliates, members, or affiliates of members. Id.  This proposed definition also 
excludes immediate family members of the aforementioned persons from qualifying as 
public directors. Id. 
 89. Id. at 63,738. 
 90. See Press Release, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Proposes Rules to Mitigate 
Conflicts of Interest Involving Security-Based Swaps (Oct. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-190.htm. 
 91. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,733. 
 92. Id. at 63,751–52. 
 93. Id. at 63,738. 
 94. Governance Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated 
Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities; Additional Requirements Regarding 
the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. 722, 729 (proposed Jan. 6, 2011). 
 95. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,752. 
 96. Id. 
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least 35% public directors and 10% DCO’s customers or customer 
representatives.97 
Further, the CFTC’s proposed conflicts of interest rule includes 
limits on the ownership of voting equity that are designed to enhance the 
proposed governance rules by limiting the influence that large 
shareholders may exert over a DCO’s Board and its committees.98  The 
proposed rule establishes two alternative limits on the ownership of 
voting equity and the exercise of voting power within a DCO.  Under 
the first alternative, an individual member may not own or vote (directly 
or indirectly) an interest that exceeds 20% of any class of voting equity 
in the DCO.99  In addition, enumerated entities,100 regardless of whether 
they are DCO members, may not collectively own or vote (directly or 
indirectly) an interest that exceeds 40% of any class of voting equity in a 
DCO.101  Under the second alternative, no DCO member or enumerated 
entity, regardless of whether that member or entity is a DCO member, 
may own or vote (directly or indirectly) an interest that exceeds 5% of 
the voting power of any class of voting equity in a DCO.102 
B. THE CFTC SHOULD ADOPT RIGOROUS GOVERNANCE STANDARDS 
THAT SAFEGUARD THE PROTECTIONS OFFERED BY THE CFTC’S FINAL 
RULE ON PARTICIPANT ELIGIBILITY 
The CFTC’s proposed conflicts of interest rule promises to curb 
SDs’ ability to manipulate DCOs’ policies and procedures and, 
subsequently, to restrict access to clearing.  However, the CFTC’s final 
conflicts of interest rule must expand the protections offered in the 
proposed rule if the rule is to ensure fair and open access to clearing. 
                                                                                                                                
 
 97. Id. at 63,740. 
 98. See id. at 63,738 (noting the importance of independent decision-makers for 
designated entities). 
 99. Id. at 63,733. 
 100. Id. at 63,750 (defining “enumerated entities” as: (1) bank holding companies 
with at least $50 billion in total consolidated assets; (2) nonbank financial companies 
“supervised by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System”; (3) an affiliate 
of (1) or (2); (4) a swap dealer; (5) a major swap participant; or (6) an “associated 
person of” (4) or (5)). 
 101. Id. at 63,733. 
 102. Id. 
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1. The CFTC Must Increase the Proposed Minimum Percentages for 
Public Directors to Ensure DCOs Remain Independent of the 
Competitive and Commercial Concerns of DCO Members 
The CFTC’s final governance standards should increase the 
required percentage of public directors for a DCO’s Board of Directors 
from 35% to 50% and mandate that at least 35% of a DCO’s 
disciplinary panel comprise of public directors.  Increasing the minimum 
percentage of public directors who serve on a DCO’s Board from 35% 
to 50% is consistent with the CFTC’s original proposed standard for the 
Boards of DCMs.103  In its original proposal for DCMs, the CFTC 
argued that “the fifty percent minimum standard strikes a favorable 
balance between inside expertise and ‘outside’ impartiality” and ensures 
that other exchange stakeholders are adequately represented.”104  The 
CFTC also argued that requiring Boards to comprise of at least 50% 
“public” directors would align DCM governance with other corporate 
practices.105  These arguments are no less applicable to DCOs, which 
have “unprecedented influence over the manner in which a swap 
contract can be executed.”106  Additionally, requiring DCO disciplinary 
panels to comprise of at least 35% of public directors is consistent with 
the standards proposed for risk management committees and would 
ensure the “independent perspective” of DCO disciplinary committees 
far more effectively than the single-public-director standard established 
in the proposed rules.107 
Contrary to arguments made by the financial services industry, 
increasing the number of public directors on DCO Boards and governing 
committees would not destabilize DCO governance.  Goldman Sachs 
and Deutsche Bank have argued that persons who are not associated 
with a large financial institutions lack the “critical swap-market 
expertise” necessary to effectively manage a DCO.108  DCO directors 
must have sufficient expertise in financial services, risk management, 
                                                                                                                                
 
 103. See Conflicts of Interest in Self-Regulation and Self-Regulatory Organizations, 
71 Fed. Reg. 38,740, 38,744 (proposed July 7, 2006). 
 104. Id. at 38,746. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,734 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010). 
 107. Id. at 63,737. 
 108. MILLER, supra note 11, at 8. 
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and clearing services; however, this expertise is not exclusive to persons 
who work for large SDs.  The witness lists for hearings related to the 
Dodd-Frank Act,109 the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission,110 and the 
many roundtables sponsored by the CFTC Dodd-Frank-related 
hearings111 reveal a vast number of academics, former regulators, and 
other former and current market participants who are qualified to serve 
as public directors112 on DCO Boards and committees.113 
2. The CFTC Must Impose Aggregate Limits on the Economic Interests 
That Enumerated Entities May Hold in a DCO 
As shown below, when finalized, only the proposed 20% individual 
and 40% aggregate limitations on the ownership of DCO voting equity 
promise to reduce SDs’ influence over DCO decision-making.  
However, the final rule must also apply the proposed limits on voting 
equity to the economic interest that enumerated entities may hold in a 
DCO if the final rule is to safeguard access to clearing. 
The proposed 40% aggregate limitation on the ownership of DCO 
voting equity by enumerated entities would prevent SDs from holding a 
majority stake in a DCO’s voting interest and using that stake to restrict 
access to DCO clearing facilities.  As the Department of Justice 
observed in its comments on the proposed rule, the lack of “an aggregate 
ownership cap on major derivatives dealers” would “preserv[e] the 
opportunity for these powerful entities to achieve majority ownership” 
                                                                                                                                
 
 109. See Regulatory Restructuring and Reform of the Financial System: Hearing 
Before the H. Fin. Serv. Comm., 110th Cong. III (2008), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg46591/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg46591.pdf; 
see also Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. Economy: 
Hearing Before the H. Ag. Comm. 110th Cong. III (2008), available at 
http://agriculture.house.gov/sites/republicans.agriculture.house.gov/files/testimony/110/
110-49.pdf. 
 110. Media Advisory, Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission Announces Full Witness List for First Public Hearing, (Jan. 10, 2010), 
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-news/2010-0110-
WitnessList.pdf. 
 111. See ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 2–5. 
 112. For the requirements of a Public Director, see Core Principles and Other 
Requirements for Designated Contract Markets, 77 Fed. Reg. 36612, 36720–21 (June 
19, 2012). 
 113. See MILLER, supra note 11, at 8. 
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of clearinghouses and exchange facilities and would “not sufficiently 
protect and promote the competition in the industry.”114 
In contrast, the alternative 5% limit on voting equity ownership 
without an aggregate limit would do little to limit large banks’ overall 
influence over DCO decision-making if the CFTC’s $50 million cap on 
capital requirements for DCO membership fails to diversify DCO 
ownership.  The 5% limit on the ownership of voting equity would 
allow “a mere eleven dealers to dominate the clearinghouse, control a 
majority of its members, and dictate decisions of the organization” 
without having to own a significant stake in a DOC’s voting equity.115  
For example, ICE Trust LLC—a major over-the-counter CDS 
clearinghouse that has been criticized for preventing competitors from 
becoming DCO members—is controlled by a number of major banks, 
including Goldman Sachs, Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan, Credit Suisse 
Group AG, and Bank of America Corp.116  None of these large banks 
appear to own more than a 5% interest in ICE Trust; consequently, they 
could band together using their combined 55% ownership stake to 
dictate ICE Trust’s policies and procedures. 
Furthermore, the final rule must apply the 20% individual and 40% 
aggregate limits to the economic interests that enumerated entities may 
hold in a DCO.  Although the financial industry has argued that “a 
shareholder would have direct influence over a DCO . . . only if the 
shareholder has the ability to exercise voting rights,” economic 
stakeholders can also assert indirect influence over DCOs.117   As 
                                                                                                                                
 
 114. Comment Letter from the Dep’t of Justice to the Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, supra note 49, at 2. 
 115. Comment Letter from Rep. Stephen F. Lynch to Gary Gensler, Chairman, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Oct. 18, 2010), available at 
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=26291&SearchText. 
 116. Comment Letter from Michael Greenberger, Professor, Univ. of Md. Sch. of 
Law, to David Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Re: 
Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated Contract Markets, 
and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest, at 3 
(Nov. 17, 2010) [hereinafter Comment Letter, Re: Requirements for Derivatives 
Clearing Organizations], available at http://michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger_ 
OwnershipCap_CommentLetter.pdf. 
 117. Proposed Rules, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,732, 63,742 n.77 (proposed Oct. 18, 2010) 
(noting disagreement among commentators regarding whether “a shareholder would 
have direct influence over a DCO, DCM, or SEF Board of Directors only if the 
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Heather Slavkin of the AFL-CIO observed during the Roundtable on 
Governance and Conflict of Interest in the Clearing and Listing of 
Swaps, “I think most of us can imagine a situation where someone owns 
five percent of our company and asks us to do something.  I don’t think 
it matters if that person gets to vote for the board of directors, that 
person has real influence regardless of whether it’s formal influence . . . 
.”118  Additionally, if the CFTC does not limit enumerated entities’ 
economic interests in DCOs, DCOs will likely create special entities that 
have no equity voting interests—i.e., limited partnerships—but exert 
influence over a DCO’s decision-making processes.119  Thus, in order to 
reduce SDs’ influence over DCOs, the final rule must limit the amount 
of economic interest as well as voting equity that enumerated entities 
may hold. 
CONCLUSION 
The CFTC’s final rule on participant eligibility and its proposed 
rule on conflicts of interest for DCOs promise to ensure fair and open 
access to clearing services.  The $50 million threshold established by the 
CFTC for DCO membership will increase the number of persons who 
qualify for DCO membership and so reduce concentration in the 
derivatives clearing market.  The diversification of DCO ownership 
facilitated by the final rule will, in turn, improve competition for 
clearing services and increase stability within the derivatives markets by 
ensuring that risk is distributed across a broad and diverse base of 
financial entities.  The CFTC should also adopt rigorous conflicts of 
interest rules—rules that include an aggregate limit on the amount of 
economic interest that an enumerated entity may hold in a DCO—in 
order to safeguard open access to clearing facilities and reinforce the 
$50 million threshold, as it would encourage DCO membership 
diversification. 
                                                                                                                                
 
shareholder has the ability to exercise voting rights with respect to, e.g., election, 
compensation, or removal of directors”). 
 118.  ROUNDTABLE TRANSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 153. 
 119. See Comment Letter, Re: Requirements for Derivatives Clearing 
Organizations, supra note 116, at 5. 
